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1 Introduction
Scholars and consultants in strategic management have long espoused two approaches to
strategy and organization: developing innovative new products through R&D and market
research, on the one hand, and producing existing products e¢ ciently through process control
and continuous improvement, on the other. But many observers quickly emphasize the
di¢ culty of simultaneously pursuing these explorationand exploitation(March (1991))
approaches. For example, Cost leadership usually implies tight control systems, overhead
minimization, pursuit of scale economies, and dedication to the learning curve; these could
be counterproductive for a rm attempting to di¤erentiate itself through a constant stream
of creative new products (Porter, 1985: 23). Furthermore, as Chandler (1962) famously
argued, a rms strategy and organizational structure are inextricably linked. In short,
Exploration and exploitation are quite di¤erent tasks, calling on di¤erent organizational
capabilities and typically requiring di¤erent organizational designs to e¤ect them(Roberts,
2004: 255).
In quite a di¤erent tradition, economists have long celebrated the markets price mecha-
nism for its ability to aggregate and transmit information (Hayek, 1945; Grossman, 1976).
The informativeness of the price mechanism thus raises the possibility that the market can
(wholly or partially) substitute for certain information-gathering and communication activ-
ities within the rm, thereby a¤ecting the rms optimal strategy and organizational struc-
ture. But as Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) pointed out, market equilibrium must be
internally consistent. For example, when information is costly to acquire, market prices can-
not be fully informative, otherwise no party would have an incentive to acquire information
in the rst place.
In this paper we view rms and the market as institutions that shape each other: in
industry equilibrium, each rm takes the informativeness of the price mechanism as an
important parameter in its choice of organizational design, but these design decisions in
turn a¤ect the rms participation in the market and hence the informativeness of the price
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mechanism. We thus complement the large and growing literature on how organizational
structures and processes a¤ect incentives to acquire and communicate information.1 In
particular, our analysis shows how one rms optimal organizational design depends not
only on the uncertainty it faces but also on the designs other rms choose. For example,
if the market price is very informative, then many rms will choose organizational designs
that improve incentives for other activities (say, cost reduction), e¤ectively free-riding on
the informativeness of the price mechanism. But the Grossman-Stiglitz insight implies that
not all rms can free-ride, lest the price mechanism contain no information.
As one example of how the informativeness of the price mechanism and rmsstrategic
choices interact, consider rms like Apple (an explorer that excels at developing innova-
tive products) and Dell (an exploiter that achieves low costs through rigorous supply-chain
management). Although these kinds of rms may not be direct competitors in the product
market, they do participate in some of the same input markets, and broad industry trends
do a¤ect demand at both kinds of rms. In principle, Dell could organize itself to conduct
market research and R&D (as Apple does), but Dell does not do this. Instead, Dells orga-
nizational structure and managerial attention focus on supply-chain management. Dell can,
however, infer something about broad industry trends by observing prices in Apples input
markets.
To make this example more concrete, suppose Dell observed a change in the pricing or
availability of electronics manufacturing servicesfrom rms such as Flextronics, which pro-
vide critical outsourced manufacturing and assembly services for original electronics equip-
ment manufacturers (so-called OEMs). Dell might then update its beliefs about Apples
production plans (e.g., Apple could be introducing a new product). Quite consistent with
this scenario, both Dell and Apple are indeed large customers of Flextronics, and in July
2011 a senior Flextronics executive pleaded guilty to insider-trading charges involving Ap-
1See Milgrom and Roberts (1988), Holmstrom and Tirole (1991), and Aghion and Tirole (1997) for early
work and Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) for a sample of recent work; see Bolton and Dewatripont
(2012) and Gibbons et al. (2012) for surveys.
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ples production plan2. The possibility of Dell inferring information about demand for its
products from the availability or price of electronics manufacturing services parallels our
model, in that it is the market-clearing price of an intermediate good (or, here, service) that
provides information about demand for a nal good.
We analyze an economic environment that includes uncertainty. Formally, the uncer-
tainty concerns consumersvaluation of nal goods. Many other applications of our approach
arise if we consider alternative sources of uncertainty, other than the value of downstream
goods. For example, the uncertainty might concern whether tari¤ barriers will change or
whether a new technology will fulll its promise. Interestingly, however, not all sources
of uncertainty will do: our rational-expectations model requires some element of common-
value uncertainty rather than pure private-value uncertaintypossibly partially correlated
rather than perfectly common values. As Grossman (1981: 555) puts it, in non-stochastic
economies (and certain economies with pure private-value uncertainty), No one tries to learn
anything from prices [because] there is nothing for any individual to learn. Often, however,
there is something to learn from prices, such as when there is an element of common-value
uncertainty.
To pursue these issues, we develop a rational-expectations model similar to Grossman and
Stiglitz (1976, 1980) but applied to a market for an intermediate good (i.e., prices and net
supply are non-negative and the players are risk-neutral). As in other rational-expectations
models, the price mechanism both clears the market and conveys some information from
informed to uninformed parties. The fact that the price is not perfectly informative provides
the requisite incentive for some parties to pay the cost of acquiring further information.
Relative to other rational-expectations models, the innovation here is the enrichment from
individual investors to rms, where each rm chooses one of two alternative organizational
designs (one of which inspires a party within the rm to collect costly information, as in
Grossman-Stiglitz).
2See, for instance, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/executive-pleads-guilty-to-leaking-apple-
secrets/
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To model these rms, we develop a simplied version of the classic incomplete-contracting
approach initiated by Grossman and Hart (1986), but applied to the choice of governance
structure within an organization (akin to Aghion and Tirole (1997)). To keep things simple,
our incomplete-contracts model involves only a single control right (namely, who controls
a machine that is necessary for production) and hence two feasible organizational designs.
Regardless of who controls the machine, each party can make a specic investment, but the
incentives to make these investments depend on who controls the machine. Following the
incomplete-contracts approach (i.e., analyzing one rm in isolation) reveals that the optimal
organizational design is determined by the marginal returns to these investments. In our
model all rms are homogeneous ex ante, so an incomplete-contracts analysis of a single
rm would prescribe that all rms choose the same organizational design. Relative to the
incomplete-contracts approach, the novel component of our model is the informativeness of
the price mechanism, which endogenizes the returns to the partiesspecic investments and
hence creates an industry-level determinant of an individual rms choice of organizational
design.
In summary, our model integrates two familiar approaches: rational expectations (where
an imperfectly informative price mechanism both permits rational inferences by some par-
ties and induces costly information acquisition by others) and incomplete contracts (where
equilibrium investments depend on the allocation of control, and control rights are allocated
to induce second-best investments). Our main results are that: (1) under mild regularity
conditions an equilibrium exists; (2) ex ante identical rms may choose heterogeneous orga-
nizational designs; and (3) rmschoices of organizational design and the informativeness of
the price mechanism interact. In fact, in our model, certain organizational designs may be
sustained in market equilibrium only because the price system allows some rms to benet
from the information-acquisition investments of others. We also provide comparative statics
on the proportion of rms that choose one organizational design or the other.
Grossman and Helpman (2002), Legros and Newman (2008) and Legros and Newman
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(2009) analyze other interactions between rms governance structures and the market.
These papers di¤er from ours in two respects. First, in modeling rms choice of gover-
nance structures, they focus on the boundary of the rm (i.e., the integration decision)
whereas we focus on the organizational design (specically, the allocation of control within
the organization). Second, we focus on the informativeness of the price mechanism, whereas
they focus on di¤erent aspects of the market.3 As Grossman (1981: 555) suggests, however,
such models are not useful as a tool for thinking about how goods are allocated. . . when. . .
information about the future. . . a¤ects current prices. In contrast to the aforementioned
papers, our model focuses on the informative role of prices transferring information from
informed to (otherwise) uninformed parties. We therefore see our approach as complemen-
tary to these others: in economies with uncertainty, the price mechanism clears the market
and communicates information and hence can a¤ect how rms design their structures and
processes to acquire and communicate information within the rm; without uncertainty,
however, governance and pricing can still interact, for the reasons explained in these papers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we specify and discuss
the model. Section 3 analyzes the organizational-design choice of a single rm in iso-
lation, and Section 4 analyzes the informativeness of the price mechanism, taking rms
organizational-design choices as given. Section 5 then combines the incomplete-contracts
and rational-expectations aspects of the previous two sections, analyzing the equilibrium
choices of organizational designs for all the rms in the industry and hence deriving our
main results. Section 6 o¤ers an enrichment of our model in terms of rmschoices about
their boundaries and discusses how our approach relates to existing theories of rm bound-
aries. Section 7 discusses our models implications for empirical work on organizational
structures and rmsboundaries, and Section 8 concludes.
3For example, Grossman and Helpman (2002) view the market as a matching mechanism, where e¢ ciency
increases in the number of rms participating; the quality of matching determines the returns to outsourcing,
which then depends on how many other rms choose outsourcing. And in Legros and Newman (2009), supply
and demand determine prices, which in turn determine the return to partiesactions and hence the parties
optimal governance structures; meanwhile the parties actions in turn determine supply and demand, so
governance and pricing interact.
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2 The Model
2.1 Overview of the Model
We begin with an informal description of our model. There is a continuum of rms, each
consisting of an engineerand a marketerwho both participate in a production process
that can transform one intermediate good (a widget) into one nal good. Any rm may
purchase a widget in the intermediate-good market. Each rm has a machine that can
transform one widget into one nal good at a cost. The engineer in a given rm has human
capital that allows her to make investments that reduce the cost of operating that rms
machine. Likewise, the marketer in a given rm has human capital that allows him to make
investments that deliver information about the value of a nal good.
As is standard in incomplete-contracting models, the partiesincentives to make invest-
ments depend on the allocation of control. There are two possible organizational designs
(i.e. governance structures inside the rm): marketing control and engineering control. In
particular, in our model, only the party that controls the machine will have an incentive to
invest. Thus, in rms where the marketer controls the machine, the marketer invests in
information about the value of the nal good, whereas in rms where the engineer controls
the machine, the engineer invests instead in cost reduction and relies solely on the price
mechanism for information about the value of the nal good. Naturally, if the price mech-
anism is more informative, the returns to investing in information are lower so rms have
a greater incentive to choose engineer control and invest instead in cost reduction. As in
rational-expectations models, however, when fewer rms invest in gathering information, the
price mechanism becomes less informative, thereby making marketer control more attractive.
An industry equilibrium must balance these two forces. We show that, given a rational-
expectations equilibrium, a unique equilibrium exists and is often interior (even though rms
are identical ex ante). In this sense, the price mechanism induces heterogeneous behavior
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among homogeneous rms.4
In subsection 2.5 we o¤er an elaboration of the basic model where rather than the uncer-
tainty being about an existing good, it is about the value of a new product. There are now
two production periods, and in order for the new product to be produced the machine must
be taken o­ ineand retooled in the rst period. One can think of this retoolingas
devoting resources to innovation and new product development. In the spirit of Christensen
(1997), the new product created by informed rms may be more valuable than the current
product produced by uninformed rms. The cost of devoting these resources to innovation
is the inability to produce the existing product in the rst period. The controller of the
machine now has a choice between producing the existing good in both periods, or the new
good in second period but nothing in the rst. We feel that this elaboration ts the Apple-
Dell example (and others like it) quite well. We show that despite the additional model
complexity, none of the existence results or qualitative predictions of the model is altered.
But since this elaborated model adds notational complexity we perform our analysis in the
body of the paper on the basic model.
2.2 Statement of the Problem
There is a unit mass of risk-neutral rms. Each rm i 2 [0; 1] consists of two parties, denoted
Ei and Mi; and a machine that is capable of developing one intermediate good (a widget)
into one nal good at cost ci  U [c; c] : The machine can be controlled by either party, but
it is rm-specic (i.e., the machine is useless outside the rm) and its use is non-contractible
(i.e., only the party who controls the machine can decide whether to operate it). If party Ei
controls the machine, we say that the governance structure in rm i is gi = E; whereas if
party Mi controls the machine, we say that gi =M:
Final goods have an uncertain value. Party Mi can invest at cost KM to learn the value
of a nal good in the market, v  U [v; v] : If Mi incurs this cost, Ei observes that Mi is
4We label our parties engineerand marketerbecause their investments produce cost reductions and
demand forecasts, respectively.
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informed but does not herself observe v: Party Ei can invest at cost KE in reducing the
cost of operating the rms machine. If Ei incurs this cost, Mi observes that Ei invested,
so it is common knowledge that ci is reduced to ci  , where   c: Both of these invest-
ments are non-contractible (e.g., for Ei, neither the act of investing nor the resulting cost is
contractible).
We embed these rms in a rational-expectations model of price formation in intermediate
good markets. Firms may purchase widget(s) in the intermediate-good market. The supply
of widgets, x, is random and inelastic. Assume x  U [x; x].
Equilibrium in the market for widgets occurs at the price p that equates supply and
demand (from informed and uninformed rms). In making decisions about purchasing a
widget, rms that are not directly informed about v (from investments by their marketers)
make rational inferences about v from the market price for widgets. Firms choose their
governance structures (i.e., machine control) taking into account the information they will
infer from the market price and hence the relative returns to their two partiesinvestments.
2.3 Timing and Assumptions
We now state the timing and assumptions of the model more precisely. We comment on
these assumptions in Section 2.4. There are six periods.
Figure 1: Timeline
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In the rst period, industry-level uncertainty is resolved: the value of a nal good v is
drawn from U [v; v] and the widget supply x is drawn from U [x; x] ; but neither of these
variables is observed by any party.
In the second period, the parties in each rm negotiate a governance structure gi 2
fE;Mg: under gi = E; party Ei controls the machine that can develop one widget into one
nal good; under gi = M; party Mi controls this machine. This negotiation of governance
structure occurs via Nash bargaining.
In the third period, parties Ei and Mi simultaneously choose whether to make non-
contractible investments (or not) at costsKE andKM ; respectively. The acts of making these
investments are observable but not veriable, but the outcome of the marketers investment
(namely, learning v) is observable only to Mi; not Ei:
In the fourth period, production planning takes place, in two steps. In period 4a, the
parties Ei and Mi commonly observe ci  U [c; c], the raw cost of running their machine,
as well as i 2 f0;g, the amount of cost reduction achieved by Eis specic investment.
Also, Mi (but not Ei) observes 'i 2 f;; vg ; a signal about the value v of the nal good,
where 'i = ; is the uninformative signal received if party Mi has not invested KM in period
3, and 'i = v is the perfectly informative signal received if KM has been invested. We use
the following notation for the parties information sets: sMi = (ci; i; 'i) ; s
E
i = (ci; i; ;) ;
and si =
 
sMi ; s
E
i

: In period 4b, the market for widgets clears at price p: In particular,
any rm may buy a widget (wi = 1) but will not demand more than one widget because the
machine can produce only one nal good from one widget.
In the fth period, production occurs: if the party in control of the machine in rm i has
a widget, then he or she can run the machine to develop the widget into a nal good at cost
ci   i. We denote the decision to produce a nal good by qi = 1 and the decision not to
do so by qi = 0: In principle, o¤ the equilibrium path, one party might control the machine
and the other have a widget, in which case the parties bargain over the widget and then
the machine controller makes the production decision. We assume that cashow rights and
10
control rights are inextricable, so that whichever party controls the machine owns the nal
good (if one is produced) and receives the proceeds.
Finally, in the sixth period, nal goods sell for v and payo¤s are realized. The expected
payo¤s (before v is realized) are
giEi = 1fgi=Eg1fwi=1g

1fqi=1g
 
E

vjsEi ; p (; ) = p
  ci + i  p ; and
giMi = 1fgi=Mg1fwi=1g

1fqi=1g
 
E

vjsMi ; p (; ) = p
  ci + i  p : (1)
2.4 Discussion of the Model
Before proceeding with the analysis, we pause to comment on some of the modeling choices
we have made.
First, we assume that the machine is rm-specic. This assumption allows us to focus on
the market for widgets by eliminating the market for machines. By allowing both markets
to operate, one could analyze whether the informativeness of one a¤ects the other.
Second, we have only one control right (over the machine) and hence only two candidate
governance structures. Our choice here is driven purely by parsimony; extending the model
to allow more assets (and hence more governance structures) could allow more interesting
activities within organizations than our simple model delivers.
Third, we make the strong assumption that control of the machine and receipt of cashow
from selling a nal good are inextricably linked. We expect that richer models based on
weaker assumptions would yield similar results (if they can be solved).
Fourth, we have binary investments in cost reduction and information acquisition (at
costs KE and KM ; respectively), rather than continuous investment opportunities. It seems
straightforward to allow the probability of success (in cost reduction or information acquisi-
tion) to be an increasing function of the investment level, which in turn has convex cost.
Fifth, we assume inelastic widget supply x: This uncertain supply plays the role of noise
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traders, making the market price for widgets only partially informative about v; so that
parties may benet from costly acquisition of information about v:
Sixth, our assumptions that all the random variables are uniform allow us to compute
a closed-form (indeed, piece-wise linear) solution for the equilibrium price function for the
intermediate good. This tractability is useful in computing the returns to alternative gover-
nance structures, at the rm level, and hence the fraction of rms choosing each governance
structure, at the industry level.
Seventh, as in Grossman-Stiglitz and the ensuing rational-expectations literature, our
model of price formation is a reduced-form model of price-taking behavior, rather than an
extensive-form model of strategic decision-making (which might allow information transmis-
sion during the price-formation process, either by the parties as described in our model or
by one party who separates from his engineer and becomes something like a marketer).
2.5 Alternative Formulation: New Products
The idea that the information contained in prices can inuence the governance structure of
a rm does not rely critically on the uncertainty being about the demand for a nal good.
In this subsection, we show that the framework developed in sections 2:1  2:3 is equivalent
to a model in which the uncertainty concerns the potential protability of a new product.
Each dyad i 2 [0; 1] still consists of two parties, Ei and Mi. There is still a single (rm-
specic) machine that can be controlled by either Ei or Mi; and its use is non-contractible.
Now, however, production occurs over two production periods, and there are two options
facing the controller of the machine. The machine can either be (1) used in the production
of the current nal good in each period or (2) taken o­ ine for a period, retooled, and then
deployed toward the production of a new good. The current good can be produced in both
production periods if the dyad purchases a single widget at price p. In this case, the current
good sells for 1
2
v0 in each period and costs 12 (ci   i) in each period to produce. Production
of the new good does not require a widget, and it yields a net benet of 0 in the rst
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production period and v1 in the second production period. As a departure from sections 2.1
to 2.3, v0 is commonly known, but v1 is uncertain. Dene v = v0   v1 and assume that
v  U [v; v]. Party Mi can invest KM to learn about v1 (and hence v). Party Ei can invest
KE to reduce the cost of producing the current good (but not the new good) by . As
before, the supply of widgets, x, is random and inelastic. Assume x  U [x; x].
There are now seven periods:
1. Uncertainty resolution: v  U [v; v] and x  U [x; x] are drawn. Neither is observed.
2. Governance structure determination: Ei and Mi negotiate a governance structure gi 2
fE;Mg via Nash bargaining
3. Investment period: Ei and Mi simultaneously decide whether or not to invest at costs
KE and KM , respectively.
4. Production planning: Ei andMi commonly observe ci  U [c; c] and i 2 f0;g. Also,
Mi (but not Ei) observes 'i 2 f0; vg. The market for widgets clears at price p. Any
rm may buy a widget at this price.
5. Production period 1: The party with control chooses either to produce or to retool the
machine. Production is possible only if the dyad purchased a widget in period 4. If
the party decides to produce, then one unit of the current nal good is produced at
cost 1
2
(ci   i) and sold into the market at price v0. If the party decides to retrot
the machine, then no production occurs.
6. Production period 2: If dyad i has produced in the previous period, it can produce
again and receive another 1
2
v0  12 (ci   i). If dyad i has not produced in the previous
period, it can produce the new good and receive net surplus v1.
7. Payo¤s are realized. Dene qi to be equal to 1 if production occurs in periods 5 and
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6 and equal to 0 otherwise. The expected payo¤s (before v is realized) are
giEi = 1fgi=Eg1fwi=1g

1fqi=1g
 
E

vj sEi ; p (; ) = p
  ci + i  p
+1fgi=EgE

v1j sEi ; p (; ) = p

; and
giMi = 1fgi=Mg1fwi=1g

1fqi=1g
 
E

vj sMi ; p (; ) = p
  ci + i  p
+1fgi=MgE

v1j sMi ; p (; ) = p

.
Here, sEi and s
M
i are dened as in section 2.3. The rst line in each of the above
expressions is the same as (1). We show in the appendix that the second line in each
expression does not a¤ect any of the qualitative predictions of the model.
In light of this, as we mentioned earlier, we now return to basic model (i.e. a single
production period) for the remainder of the paper.
3 Individual Firm Behavior
As a building block for our ultimate analysis, we rst analyze the behavior of a single rm
taking the market price p as given. Optimal behavior involves purchasing a widget only if
one is going to produce. Dene the gross surplus to the parties in a rm as GSgii = 
gi
Mi
+giEi ;
i.e.
GSi (gi; si) = 1fqi=1g [E [vjsgii ; p (; ) = p]  p  (ci   i)] :
The e¢ cient production decision is qi = 1 if Ex;v [vj sgii ; p]  p+ ci   i; and the maximized
expected gross surplus in period 4 is then
GSi (gi; si) = Ex;v [ (v   ci + i   p) qi (gi; si; p)j sgii ; p] :
Recall that the controller of the machine both controls the production decisions and
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receives the cashows. Consequently, the other party receives zero. These payo¤s determine
the partiesinvestment incentives in period 3, as follows.
Let the subscript pair (I; 0) denote the situation in which Mi invested and hence is
informed about v but Ei did not invest in cost reduction. Likewise (U;) ; denotes the
situation in which Mi did not invest but Ei did, hence reducing production costs by ; and
(U; 0) denotes the situation in which neither invested. Now dene the following:
I;0 = Eci [GS

i (M; si)] if 'i = v; i = 0;
U; = Eci [GS

i (E; si)] if 'i = ;; i = ; and
U;0 = Eci [GS

i (gi; si)] if 'i = ;; i = 0:
Formally, these expectations are triple integrals over (ci; x; v) space:
I;0 =
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z v p(x;v)
c
(v   p (x; v)  ci) dF (ci; x; v) ;
U; =
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z E[vjp] p(x;v)+
c
(v   p (x; v) +   ci) dF (ci; x; v) ; and
U;0 =
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z E[vjp] p(x;v)
c
(v   p (x; v)  ci) dF (ci; x; v) ;
where F is the joint distribution function.
Since one partys expected payo¤ in period 4 is independent of its investment, at most
one party will invest in period 3. If Ei controls the machine (gi = E), she will invest if
U; KE  U;0: Similarly, ifMi controls the machine (gi =M); he will invest if I;0 KM 
U;0: We assume that KE and KM are small relative to the benets of investment, so the
party that controls the machine will invest.5
To proceed, we need to compute the price function p (x; v) : This involves analyzing the
behavior of other rms, as follows.
5This condition can be stated in terms of primitives of the model, but since this is the economic assumption
we are making, we state it in this fashion.
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4 Rational Expectations in the Market for Intermedi-
ate Goods
Recall that there is a unit mass of rms indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Who buys a widget? Let
cM (v; p) = v   p be the highest cost at which a marketer who has invested in information
(and hence knows v) would be prepared to produce a nal good, and similarly let cE (p) =
E [vj p]  p+ be the highest cost at which an engineer who has invested in cost reduction
(but not information) would be prepared to produce. Suppose (as we will endogenize below)
that a fraction  of rms have M control (and hence know v), whereas fraction 1   have
E control (and hence costs reduced by ). Demand for widgets is therefore

v   p  c
c  c + (1  )
E [vj p (x; v) = p] +   p  c
c  c :
The market-clearing price equates this demand with the supply, which recall is x; so
p = (1  )E [vj p (x; v) = p] + v   (c  c)x+ (1  )  c:
The conditional expectation of v given p therefore must satisfy
E [vj p (; ) = p]  p+ (c  c)x+ c  (1  )  v
1   ; (2)
where the equivalence relation indicates that (2) must hold as an identity in x and v:
Denition 1 An industry conguration is a vector  = (I; I0; U; U0) consisting of
the masses of dyads that are, respectively, informed and have cost reduction, informed and
do not have cost reduction, uninformed and have cost reduction, and uninformed and do not
have cost reduction.
Denition 2 Given an industry conguration, , a rational-expectations equilibrium
("REE") is a price function p (x; v) and a production allocation fqigi2[0;1] such that
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1. qi = qi (gi; si; p) for all i, and
2. The market for widgets clears for each (x; v) 2 [x; x] [v; v].
The fact that the party who does not control the asset receives none of the cashow
implies that this party will not invest, so I; = 0: Furthermore, KE and KM small implies
U;0 = 0. Therefore  = I;0 and 1    = U;: The problem of nding a rational-
expectations price function in this model thus becomes one of nding a xed point of (2).
In the appendix we solve for this xed point, showing that it is piecewise-linear over three
regions of (x; v) space: a low-price region, a moderate-price region, and a high-price region.
This leads to
Proposition 1 Given an industry conguration, there exists a piecewise-linear price func-
tion with three regions that characterizes a rational-expectations equilibrium.
We prove this proposition and derive the price function in the appendix, but to build
some intuition for this result, consider the gure below, which shows the three regions of
(x; v) space, Rj for j = 1; 2; 3: The low-price region R
1
 begins from the lowest feasible price,
pL at (x; v) ; and extends up to the price p at (x; v) : The moderate-price region R2 then
extends from price p up to the price p at (x; v) ; where the under- and over-lined notation for
prices is chosen to match the (x; v) coordinates. Finally, the high-price region R3 extends
from p up to the highest feasible price, pH at (x; v) :
Figure 2: Regions of Piecewise-Linear Pricing Function
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Within each region, the iso-price loci are linear. In particular, solving pj (x; v) = p for v
yields
v =  
j
1
j2
x+
p  j0
j2
as an iso-price line in (x; v) space. Because x and v are independent and uniform, every
(x; v) point on this line is equally likely. Thus, after observing p; an informed party projects
this iso-price line onto the v-axis and concludes that the conditional distribution of v given p
is uniform, with support depending on which region p is in. For example, if p < p then the
lower bound on v is v and the upper bound is some v (p) < v: Alternatively, if p < p < p
then the lower and upper bounds on v are v and v; so p is uninformative. Finally, if p > p
then the lower bound is some v (p) > v and the upper bound is v:6
Given this uniform conditional distribution of v given p; the conditional expectation on
the left-hand side of (2) is then the average of these upper and lower bounds on v: The
coe¢ cients j0; 
j
1; and 
j
2 can then be computed by substituting p
j (x; v) for p on both sides
of (2) and equating coe¢ cients on like terms so that (2) holds as an identity. The slope of
an iso-price line,  j1=j2; is decreasing in ; meaning that in regions 1 and 3 uninformed
parties can make tighter estimates of v from p when more parties are informed.
5 Industry Equilibrium
To recapitulate, Section 3 analyzed the production decision, taking p (; ) as exogenous, and
Section 4 endogenized prices. In this section, therefore, we endogenize the governance-
structure choices of each rm and dene an industry equilibrium, as follows.
Denition 3 An industry equilibrium is a set of rms of mass ; a price function
p (x; v) ; and a production allocation fqigi2[0;1] such that
1. Each rm optimally chooses gi; with a fraction 
 choosing gi =M ;
6Note that in this model, but not Grossman-Stiglitz, extreme prices are very informative and intermediate
prices are less informative. In fact, with the slopes of the price functions as drawn in the above gure,
intermediate price are completely uninformative.
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2. Each party optimally chooses whether or not to invest;
3. qi = qi (gi; si; p) and wi = w

i (gi; si; p) ; and
4. The market for widgets clears for each (x; v) 2 [x; x] [v; v] :
The choice in period 2 is between the two possible governance structures: gi = E or
gi = M: Given ; the ex ante expected net surpluses from choosing the two governance
structures are
NSE () = U; () KE; and
NSM () = I;0 () KM .
In an interior equilibrium, rms must be indi¤erent between the two governance structures.
Thus our goal is to nd  such that NSE () = NSM () and to characterize how 
varies as we change the parameters of the model. For simplicity we assume that KE =
KM = K: (The case where KE 6= KM is discussed at the end of this section.) We therefore
seek  such that
I;0 (
) = U; (
) ;
or equivalently,
I;0 (
)  U;0 () = U; ()  U;0 () : (3)
To keep notation compact, let v = 1p12 (v   v) ; x = 1p12 (x  x) ; and x = (x+ x) =2:
We will use the following fact (which is derived in the appendix).
Fact 1 Assume   (c  c) x
v
. Then
I;0 ()  U;0 () = 1
2
2v
c  c

1  1
2

c  c
v
x

and
U; ()  U;0 () = 
2
c  c 
1
2
2
c  c + x:
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Observe that the rst expression is decreasing in  and the second is increasing in :
This leads to the following characterization of industry equilibrium, under the regularity
conditions that c; c; x; v; > 0 with c  : We refer to the case where (c  c)x  v
as the noisy outside demand case, and in that case we obtain a closed form solution for the
proportion of rms that choose each governance structure.
Proposition 2 An industry equilibrium exists, and there is a unique industry conguration
associated with the price function characterized in Proposition 1. In the noisy outside demand
case, the industry conguration associated with the industry equilibrium is as follows:
 =
2v +
2   2 (c  c)x
2v
2
v=x
c c + 2
2
(4)
if the right-hand side of (4) is in [0; 1]. If the right-hand side of (4) is less than 0, then
 = 0; if it is greater than 1, then  = 1.
Proof. If 2v  2 (c  c)x   2; then U;0 (0)  U; (0) and thus, since the left-hand
side of (2) is decreasing in , it follows that  = 0. Similarly, if 2v

1  1
2
1
c c
v
x


2 (c  c)x+2, then U;0 (1)  U; (1), and since the right-hand side of (2) is increasing
in , we must have that  = 1. Otherwise, we want to nd  such that
0 = I;0 (
)  U; ()
=
2v +
2   2 (c  c)x
2 (c  c)  

2 (c  c)

v=x
c  c
2v
2
+ 22

;
which yields expression (4).
Proposition 2 is our main result, establishing that, given our rational expectations equi-
librium, there exists a unique industry equilibrium and providing an explicit expression for
the proportion of rms that choose each of the governance structures. As the proposition
makes clear, this proportion may well be interior.7 Recall, however, that our rms are
7Models of industry equilibrium from IO (Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990)) and trade (McLaren (2000),
Grossman and Helpman (2002), Antras (2003)) typically feature strategic complementarities in governance
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homogeneous ex ante, so an incomplete-contract style analysis (taking each rm in isolation)
would prescribe that they all choose the same governance structure. In this sense, the infor-
mativeness of the price mechanism can induce heterogeneous behaviors from homogeneous
rms. To put this point di¤erently, in this model, the price mechanism can be seen as
endogenizing the parameters of the incomplete-contract model so that rms are indi¤erent
between governance structures. In a richer model, with heterogeneous investment costs,
almost every rm would have strict preferences between governance structures, with only
the marginal rm being indi¤erent.
We are also able to perform some comparative statics. First, when the ex ante level of
fundamental uncertainty increases (i.e., v is higher), the return to investing in acquiring
information increases, so  increases. An increase in noise (i.e., x is higher) has an identical
e¤ect. An increase in x increases the probability of production, which disproportionately
benets E-control rms, decreasing . Finally, an increase in  has two e¤ects. The
rst is the partial-equilibrium channel through which an increase in the benets of choosing
engineer ownership (and hence investing in cost reduction) makes engineer control relatively
more appealing, reducing . In an industry equilibrium, however, there is also a price e¤ect.
For a xed fraction 1    of parties that invest in cost reduction, an increase in  makes
widgets more valuable, which in turn increases demand and hence average prices. Since
rms with engineer control purchase widgets over a larger region of the ci space than do
rms with marketing control, the former face this increase in average price level relatively
more than do rms with marketer control, so the price e¤ect militates towards an increase in
: Which of these two e¤ects dominates depends on the parameters of the model. Collecting
these together we have
Proposition 3 In the noisy outside demand case: (i) an increase in the uncertainty of
either the supply of the intermediate good or the value of the nal good or a decrease in the
structure, and hence generically produce equilibria in which ex ante identical rms organize identically. One
exception to this is Avenel (2008), who shows that investments in cost reduction (and hence governance
structures that promote cost reduction) are strategic substitutes when rms compete Bertrand.
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average supply of the intermediate good leads to an increase in the fraction of dyads that
choose to become marketing-oriented; (ii) an increase in the level of potential cost-reduction
leads to an increase in the fraction of dyads that choose to become engineering-oriented if
there is su¢ cient uncertainty regarding the value of the nal good. If this level of uncertainty
is low, the opposite may be true.
Proof. See appendix.
Finally, our incomplete-contracts approach sheds new light on the functioning of the
price mechanism. In particular, most partially-revealing REE models compare the benets
of acquiring information to the exogenously specied costs of acquiring information. As
our model shows, however, what matters is not only these exogenous costs, KM ; but also
the opportunity cost of choosing a governance structure that provides incentives to invest
in information (namely, the foregone opportunity for cost reduction). To analyze these
opportunity costs, consider the expression for  when KE 6= KM :
 =
2v +
2   2 (c  c) (x+KM  KE)
2v
2
v=x
c c + 2
2
:
Note the presence of production parameters, such as  and KE; which have nothing per se
to do with market clearing or price formation. More importantly, note that comparative
statics regarding the informativeness of the price mechanism, such as @=@KM ; can depend
on production parameters such as :
In addition to comparative statics that illustrate the potential e¤ects of production pa-
rameters on rational-expectations equilibrium, we can also say something about how the
production environment a¤ects markets. For example, in GHP we showed that (as in
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) market thickness depends on ; with concomitant implica-
tions for economic e¢ ciency and welfare. In this papers setting, therefore, market thickness
depends on production parameters such as  and KE:
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6 Markets and Hierarchies Revisited
While our main focus is on the interaction between the choice of organizational designs by
individual rms and the informativeness of the markets price mechanism, a straightforward
extension of our model also sheds light on the interaction between the choice of individual
rmsboundaries and the informativeness of the price mechanism. Like our analysis of orga-
nizational designs, this section shows that omitting the price mechanism from the analysis of
rmsboundaries can be problematic. In particular, we nd that incentives to make specic
investments (which now drive rmsboundary decisions) a¤ect the informativeness of the
price mechanism and vice versa.
To extend and reinterpret our model, consider a vertical production process with three
stages (1, 2, and 3) and a di¤erent asset used at each stage (A1, A2, and A3). There are
again two parties, now denoted upstream (formerly E) and downstream (formerly M). The
conditions of production are such that it is optimal for the upstream party (U) to own A1
and for the downstream party (D) to own A3, so there are only two governance structures
of interest (namely, U owns A2 or D owns it). Thus, the asset A2 is analogous to the
machine from our original model, but we now focus on asset ownership as determining the
boundary of the rm, rather than machine control as determining organizational designs.
Because upstream necessarily owns A1 and downstream A3, we interpret U ownership of A2
as forward vertical integration and D ownership as backward. Beyond this reinterpretation
of governance structures in terms of rmsboundaries, all the formal aspects of the model
are unchanged. Under this reinterpretation, analogs of Propositions 1 through 3 continue to
hold.8 In particular, our characterizations of the rational-expectations equilibrium and the
industry equilibrium continue to hold, as do the comparative-statics results.
We see this sections discussion as directly related to some of the classic contributions
to organizational economics. For example, Coase (1937: 359) argued that it is surely
8For formal statements and proofs, see an earlier working-paper version: Gibbons et al. (2010), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15779.pdf.
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important to enquire why co-ordination is the work of the price mechanism in one case
and of the entrepreneur in the other (emphasis added). Similarly, Williamsons (1975)
title famously emphasized Marketsas the alternative to hierarchy. For the next quarter
century, however, the literature on rmsboundaries focused on the transaction as the unit
of analysis. In short, non-integration replaced the market in the theory of the rm.
As noted in our Introduction, beginning with Grossman and Helpman (2002), recent work
has begun to bring back market interactions as a determinant of rmsintegration decisions;
see also Legros and Newman (2008, 2009) for more in this spirit. As we described, however,
our model di¤ers from these in our focus on the informativeness of the price mechanism.
Interestingly, our focus allows us to revisit a specic argument from Markets and Hierar-
chies, beyond the title. In the books opening pages, Williamson summarizes Hayeks (1945)
observations about information in market prices, but Williamson then argues that prices
often do not qualify as su¢ cient statistics and . . . a substitution of internal organization
(hierarchy) for market-mediated exchange often occurs on this account(1975: 5).
To our knowledge, the extent to which market prices are su¢ cient statistics that can
inuence rms integration decisions has not been considered since 1975. The extended
model in this section allows us to analyze such inuence, in two ways: at the transaction
level (i.e., for a given pair of parties, Ui and Di) and for the market as a whole.
To link our analysis to Williamsons argument that prices not being su¢ cient statistics
might induce parties to abandon market-mediated exchange,we need to be precise about
these two concepts. A natural way to assess the extent to which prices are su¢ cient statistics
in our model is the following: the equilibrium informativeness of the price system is the
expected reduction in variance that is obtained by conditioning on price (see Denition
4 in the appendix). And in our model, market-mediated exchange also has a natural
interpretation: it means relying on information about the value of the nal good from the
price mechanism, rather than acquiring it directly.
At the transaction level, inspecting the derivation of (3) shows that (holding all else equal)
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an increase in the informativeness of prices reduces the returns to choosing an integration
structure that induces information acquisition. In this sense, Williamsons argument holds
at the transaction level in our model.
Of course, in our model the informativeness of prices is endogenous, because every other
pair of parties will also be considering the returns to choosing di¤erent integration structures.
As a result, it may or may not be true for the market as a whole that when prices are less
informative, more rms are organized to induce information acquisition. In Proposition 5 (in
the appendix), we show that whether or not Williamsons argument holds for the market as a
whole depends crucially on the source of the change in the informativeness of prices: a change
in an exogenous variable may increase the informativeness of prices and yet also increase the
returns at the transaction level to choosing an integration structure that induces information
acquisition. Our model thus allows us not only to formalize Williamsons argument at the
transaction level, but also to assess its validity for the market as a whole.
7 Empirical Implications
Our model has two sets of empirical implications: across-industry and within-industry. First,
there are of course the across-industry empirical counterparts to our models comparative-
statics predictions. For example, holding other characteristics constant, industries with
greater demand uncertainty (i.e. higher 2v) should have a greater share of rms that are
organized to induce information acquisition via marketing control (or, as section 6 highlights,
via downstream integration). Similarly, industries that make use of intermediate inputs that
are subject to larger supply shocks (i.e. higher 2x) should also have more rms organized to
induce information acquisition.
In our model, information that rms care about (and organize themselves to acquire)
is commonly valued across rms in the industry. At the other extreme, if demand were
completely idiosyncratic (i.e., the consumer valuation for the product that rm i produces
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is independent of that for rm j0s product), then there would be no useful information for
the price mechanism to reveal from one rm to another, and our mechanism would not yield
any interactions in governance structures across rms. The degree to which this uncertainty
is common-value or idiosyncratic may depend on the level of product di¤erentiation within
an industry. An undi¤erentiated-good industry is likely to be characterized by common
values, and thus the informativeness of the price mechanism should be more important for
the interactions between the governance structures of rms in the industry. In contrast, a
di¤erentiated-goods industry may be between the common-value and idiosyncratic extremes,
but probably to a lesser degree.9
In order to carry out this type of analysis, one would need high-quality rm-level data
that (a) spans industries, (b) contains information about rmsgovernance-structure deci-
sions, and (c) has industry-level proxies for, say, common-value uncertainty. For example,
Antras (2003) has (a) and (b), and Syverson (2004) has (a) and (c), if we interpret product
substitutability as a proxy for common-value uncertainty.
Turning to what we refer to as within-industry analysis, where dependent variables are
at the rm level and the analysis either focuses on a particular industry or contains industry
controls, a common approach is to regress a measure of a dyads governance structure on
dyad- or transaction-level characteristics. Most of the recent empirical work on internal
organization (for example, Bresnahan et al. (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2007), and Bloom,
Sadun and van Reenen (2009)) and on rm boundaries (for example, Joskow (1985), Baker
and Hubbard (2003), Forbes and Lederman (2009)) falls in this category.
Before proceeding, note that in our model, at the time dyads make governance-structure
choices, there are no characteristics that vary at the dyad level. One goal of this homogene-
ity assumption was to highlight the idea that, even if rms are homogeneous ex ante, the
9We have analyzed an elaboration of our model in which rm i cares about consumer valuation vi, which
is equal to a common-value component v with probability
p
 and an idiosyncratic component i with
probability 1 p. v and i are uniformly distributed on v and v, but the i values are independent across
rms. At the time of production, rm i does not know whether vi = v or vi = i. Under this specication, the
ex ante correlation in consumer valuations is  and the informativeness of the price mechanism is increasing
in .
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organization of such rms could optimally be heterogeneous. In any real-world application,
however, rms are likely to be heterogeneous at the time they decide upon their governance
structure. This can be easily incorporated into our framework by allowing for heterogeneity
in investment costs. That is, let ki = KMi  KEi , with ki  U

k; k

. There will then be a
cuto¤value k such that rms with ki < k will chooseM -control and those with ki > k will
choose E-control, with  in (4) equal to (k  k)=  k   k. In this model, only the marginal
rm is indi¤erent.
In our model, one dyads governance structure also depends on the governance-structure
choices of others. As a result, a regression of one dyads governance structure on its dyad-
level characteristics will be biased. To see this, let gi = 1 if dyad i is marketing-controlled (if
the analysis is of internal organization) or if dyad i is downstream-integrated (if the analysis
is of rm boundaries), and let gi = 0 otherwise. Let Xi be the dyad-level characteristics that
are usually included in governance structure regressions (such as the level of appropriable
quasi-rents, transaction complexity, etc.), and suppose the industry we are analyzing has n
dyads. Dene  to be the correlation between dyad-level characteristics across dyads (i.e.
 = Corr (Xi; Xj)) and assume that V ar (Xi) is common across dyads. Finally, denote by
g i = 1n 1
P
j 6=i gj the industry-average governance structure not including dyad i. If the
regression of gi on Xi does not also include a measure of the governance structures of other
dyads on the right-hand side, estimates of the coe¢ cient on Xi will be biased.
In particular, using the terminology of Angrist and Pischke (2009), if we call gi = bXi+ i
the short regressionand gi = Xi + g i + "i the long regression, then the bias is given
by the following proposition (which is proved in the appendix).
Proposition 4 Suppose we estimate the short regression when the true model is given by
the long regression. Then the bias of the estimated coe¢ cient is given by
E
h
b^
Xi   = 
1   | {z }
omitted variables
+

1  

n  1 +  (1  ) | {z }
reverse causality
,
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where n is the number of rms in the industry. As n!1, the bias approaches 
1 .
As the proposition shows, the bias in the short regression is a combination of two biases:
(1) an omitted-variable bias that results from failure to include g i in the regression and (2)
a reverse-causality bias that results from the fact that, if governance structures interact, gi
also a¤ects gj for all j 6= i. The latter bias goes away if rms are atomistic (which here can
be approximated by taking n to innity), as in most models of industry equilibrium. Our
model predicts that  < 0, which implies that the omitted-variable bias biases estimates of 
towards zero. Further, this bias is greater the greater is . Di¤erent determinants of vertical
integration identied in the literature (e.g., uncertainty, transaction frequency, appropriable
quasi-rents, importance of ex ante investments) may di¤er in their correlation across rms,
so estimates of their e¤ects on vertical integration may be di¤erentially biased toward zero.
Alternatively, if  were found to be positive (and is necessarily less than one), then such
regressions would be biased away from zero.
Other models characterizing governance structures in industry equilibrium may have
di¤erent predictions. For example, Grossman and Helpmans (2002) model exhibits strategic
complementarities in outsourcing decisions, and thus their model would predict that  > 0.
The model of Legros and Newman (2009) can predict both  > 0 and  < 0, depending
on aggregate demand and the distribution of rm productivity, but since the interaction in
governance structures acts only through the equilibrium price level, if one were to control
for the market price in their model, they would predict  = 0.
This discussion suggests two potential avenues for future empirical work. First, in esti-
mating the magnitude of the classical determinants of governance structures, it would be
interesting to include industry-average governance structure to eliminate the omitted-variable
bias described above. Secondly, it would be useful to estimate, in a variety of contexts, the
causal impact of industry-average governance structures on individual governance structures.
This would require instruments for (a subset of) the governance structures of other dyads
within an industry to estimate the sign and magnitude of ; for recent work along these
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lines, see Forbes and Lederman (2010).
Finally, it is interesting to note that in every empirical study mentioned above, there is
signicant variation in the governance-structure variable at the industry level. That is, it
is almost always the case that within an industry, there are some rms that are organized
one way and other rms that are organized another. While this could potentially be due to
measurement error in industry classication (i.e., it could be an aggregation problem), we
take the view that this is an empirical fact to be explained. One potential explanation for this,
of course, is that rms di¤er in their ex ante characteristics, and thus of course some rms
organize one way and others organize di¤erently. Another view, and one that is consistent
with our model, is that industry-equilibrium e¤ects provide forces toward heterogeneity in
governance structure. This is true in models that generate a negative  but not in models
that generate a positive . Disentangling whether heterogeneity in governance structure is
due to equilibrium e¤ects or underlying heterogeneity in rm characteristics is an interesting
empirical question, and one that could be informed by estimates of .
8 Conclusion
We view rms and the market not only as alternative ways of organizing economic activity,
but also as institutions that interact and shape each other. In particular, by combining
features of the incomplete-contract theory of rmsorganizational designs and boundaries,
together with the rational-expectations theory of the price mechanism, we have developed a
model that incorporates two, reciprocal considerations. First, rms operate in the context of
the market (specically, the informativeness of the price mechanism a¤ects partiesoptimal
governance structures). And second, the buyers in the market for an intermediate good are
rms (specically, partiesgovernance structures a¤ect how they behave in this market and
hence the informativeness of the price mechanism).
In the primary interpretation of our model in terms of organizational design we pro-
29
vide a formal explanation for why similar (possibly ex ante identical) rms choose di¤er-
ent structures and strategies (specically, exploration or exploitation). Our analysis also
demonstrates that viewing an individual rm, or transaction, as the unit of analysis can
be misleading. Because of the interaction between rm-level governance choices and the
industry-wide informativeness of the price mechanism, equilibrium governance choices are
shaped by industry-wide factors.
We also showed that our model can be reinterpreted to address rmsboundaries. Again,
considering the endogenous informativeness of prices implies that both property-rights theory
and transaction-cost economics abstract from potentially important issues by focusing on the
transaction as the unit of analysis.
To develop and analyze our model, we imposed several strong assumptions that might be
relaxed in future work. For example, to eliminate a market for machines, we assumed that
machines are dyad-specic. Also, we have ignored the possibility of strategic information
transmission before or during the price-formation process. We hope to explore these and
other possibilities in future work.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Computation of Price Function
This appendix outlines the approach for constructing the price function that is used through-
out the paper. In doing so, we establish the existence of a partially revealing rational
expectations equilibrium and prove proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Given , there exists an REE characterized by a price function
p (x; v) =
3X
j=1
1f(x;v)2Rjgp
j
 (x; v) ;
where pj (x; v) = 
j
0 + 
j
1x+ 
j
2v for j = 1; 2; 3.
As in standard Walrasian general equilibrium theory, the markets must clear for each
realization of p (x; v), but as in Grossman-Stiglitz, demand is partially determined by the
function p (; ) as well as its particular realization. A REE price function must therefore
be a xed point of the following identity (which is a rearrangement of the market-clearing
condition).
E [vj p (; ) = p (x; v)]  p (x; v) + (c  c)x+ c  (1  )  v
1   ; (1)
where the conditional expectation is determined by Bayesian updating given a price realiza-
tion and assuming the equilibrium price function.
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An iso-price locus is a set of (x; v) pairs over which p (x; v) is constant. We assume that
p (; ) is increasing in v, decreasing in x, and that its iso-price curves are linear with constant
slope for all (x; v) (conditions that will of course need to be veried).
Dene pL = p (x; v) and pH = p (x; v) to be, respectively, the lowest and highest
possible prices, and dene p = p (x; v) and p = p (x; v). There are two possible cases.
Case I (with p  p) and case II (with p > p) are depicted in the following diagrams.
Case I Case 2
Further, dene R1; R
2
, and R
3
 to be, respectively, the low-, mid-, and high-price regions of
the (x; v). That is,
R1 =

(x; v) : p (x; v)  min

p; p
		
R2 =

(x; v) : min

p; p
	
< p (x; v)  max

p; p
		
R3 =

(x; v) : p (x; v) > max

p; p
		
.
Assume we are in case I. The derivation proceeds similarly for case II, and we will
describe how to determine which case applies below.
Suppose (x; v) 2 R1. Then because x and v are independent and uniform, the conditional
distribution vj p (; ) = p (x; v)  U [v1 (p (x; v)) ; v1 (p (x; v))], where v1 (p) and v1 (p) are
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the lowest and highest values of v consistent with the realized price p. As illustrated in the
following diagram, since (x; v) 2 R1, it is clear that v1 (p) = v. v1 (p) on the other hand,
solves p1 (v
1 (p) ; x) = p1 (x; v).
Since we have conjectured that p1 (x; v) = 
1
0 + 
1
1x+ 
1
2v, we have
v1
 
p1 (x; v)

= v   
1
1
12
(x  x) :
The conditional expectation of v given the realization of the price is therefore
E [vj p (; ) = p (x; v)] = v
1 (p (x; v)) + v
1 (p (x; v))
2
=
v   11
12
(x  x) + v
2
: (2)
(1) must hold as an identity, so we can substitute (2), rearrange, and use equality of
coe¢ cients to give us
10 = (1  )
v + ((c  c) =) x
2
+ (1  )  c
11 =  
1 + 
2
c  c

x
12 =
1 + 
2
:
Proceeding similarly for (x; v) 2 R2 (where v2 (p) = v and v2 (p) = v) and (x; v) 2 R3
36
(where v3 (p) = v), we have
20 = (1  )
v + v
2
+ (1  )  c
21 =   (c  c)
22 = 
and
30 = (1  )
((c  c) =)x+ v
2
+ (1  )  c
31 =  
1 + 
2
c  c

32 =
1 + 
2
:
Recall that we made the following assumptions in order to derive this: p (x; v) is (1)
decreasing in x and (2) increasing in v, (3)  @p
@x
=@p
@v
is constant for all (x; v), and (4) case I
applies. (1) and (2) are satised, since j1 < 0 < 
j
2 for j = 1; 2; 3. (3) is satised, because
 j1=j2 = c c for j = 1; 2; 3. Finally, we must verify that indeed case I applies. In case I,
the iso-price locus (which has slope c c

) is steeper than the diagonal (which has slope v v
x x).
Thus, we are indeed in case I if c c

 v v
x x or   (c  c) xv . We assume that (c  c) xv  1,
so that this condition is satised for all . This allows us to use the same price function
throughout. All of the main results of the paper go through if we drop this assumption, but
we are no longer able to obtain a closed-form solution for the equilibrium industry structure.
Computing the price function when  > (c  c) x
v
is similar to the above analysis.
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9.2 Omitted Proofs
9.2.1 Derivation of Fact 1
Ex;v;ci [U;0 ()]  Ex;v;ci [U;0 ()] =
1
2
1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
 
v2   2vjp

dxdv
=
1
2
Ex;v
h
2vjp
i
c  c =
1
2
2v
c  c

1  
2
v=x
c  c

;
which is continuous and strictly decreasing in  and similarly,
Ex;v;ci [U; ()]  Ex;v;ci [U;0 ()] =
2
2 (c  c) + 
Ex;v

vjp (x; v)
  c  Ex;v [p (x; v)]
(c  c)
=
2
c  c 
2
2 (c  c) + x;
which is continuous and strictly increasing in . For the last equalities in these two
expressions, we use the following three facts:
Ex;v

vjp

= v;
Ex;v

2vjp

= 2v

1  
2
v=x
c  c

; and
Ex;v [p (x; v)] = v + (1  )  x (c  c)  c;
which we now prove. First note that when   (c  c) x
v
, p (x; v) =
P3
j=1 1f(x;v)2Rjgp
j
 (x; v),
where
p1 (x; v) = (1  )
v + ((c  c) =) x
2
+ (1  )  c+ 1 + 
2
v   1 + 
2
c  c

x
p2 (x; v) = (1  )
v + v
2
+ (1  )  c+ v   (c  c)x
p3 (x; v) = (1  )
((c  c) =)x+ v
2
+ (1  )  c+ 1 + 
2
v   1 + 
2
c  c

x;
38
and
R1 =

(x; v) : p1 (x; v)  p1 (x; v)
	
R2 =

(x; v) : p2 (x; v) < p
2
 (x; v)  p2 (x; v)
	
R3 =

(x; v) : p3 (x; v) < p
3
 (x; v)
	
.
We can rewrite the prices as
p1 (x; v) = p
2
 (x; v) 
1  
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

p2 (x; v) = (1  )
v + v
2
+ (1  )  c+ v   (c  c)x
p3 (x; v) = p
2
 (x; v) +
1  
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

:
For simplicity of notation, dene Rj (v) =

x : (x; v) 2 Rj
	
. That is
R1 (v) =

x  
c  c (v   v) ; x

R2 (v) =

x+

c  c (v   v) ; x 

c  c (v   v)

R3 (v) =

x; x+

c  c (v   v)

:
Finally, note that
1vjp (x; v) = v  
1
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

2vjp (x; v) = v
3vjp (x; v) = v +
1
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

:
Claim 1 Ex;v

vjp

= v
Proof. Follows directly from the Law of Iterated Expectations.
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Claim 2 Ex;v
h
2vjp
i
= 2v

1  
2
v=x
c c

Proof. Here, we want to compute
Ex;v

2vjp

=
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x  
c c (v v)

v2    1vjp2 dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x  
c c (v v)
x+ 
c c (v v)
 
v2   (v)2

dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x+ 
c c (v v)
x

v2    3vjp2 dxdv
If we substitute and rearrange, this becomes
Ex;v

2vjp

=
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
 
v2   (v)2

dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x  
c c (v v)
0B@ v (v   v)  c c (x  x)
 1
4

(v   v)  c c

(x  x)2
1CA dxdv
  1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x+ 
c c (v v)
x
0B@ v (v   v)  c c (x  x)
+1
4

(v   v)  c c

(x  x)2
1CA dxdv
Integrating, we get
Ex;v

2vjp

= 2v +
v
x

c  c

v
(v   v)
6
  1
4
2v

  v
x

c  c

v
(v   v)
6
+
1
4
2v

= 2v

1  
2
v=x
c  c

;
which was the original claim.
Claim 3 Ex;v [p (x; v)] = v + (1  )  x (c  c)  c
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Proof. Similarly as above,
Ex;v [p (x; v)] =
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x  
c c (v v)
p1 (x; v) dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x  
c c (v v)
x+ 
c c (v v)
p2 (x; v) dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x+ 
c c (v v)
x
p3 (x; v) dxdv:
If we substitute and rearrange, we get
Ex;v [p (x; v)] =
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
p2 (x; v) dxdv
  1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x  
c c (v v)
1  
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x+ 
c c (v v)
x
1  
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

dxdv
or since the last two expressions are equal but with opposite signs,
Ex;v [p (x; v)] = v + (1  )  (c  c)x   c;
which is the desired expression
9.2.2 Derivation of Fact 2
Explicit computation yields the following benet for choosing g = U
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E [I;0]  E [U;0] = 1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z v p
c
(v   p  ci) dcidxdv
  1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z v p
c
(v   p  ci) dcidxdv
=
1
2
1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
(v   v)2 dxdv
=
1
2
2v
c  c;
and similarly the benets for choosing g = D are
E [U;]  E [U;0] = 1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z v p+
c
(v   p+  ci) dcidxdv
  1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z v p
c
(v   p  ci) dcidxdv
=
1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x

(v   p)  c+ 
2
2

dxdv
=
1
2
2 + 2 (v   p  c)
c  c :
Before o¤ering a proof of Proposition 3, we observe that an equivalent but more formal
statement of the Proposition stated in the text is as follows.
Proposition 3 (Alternative Statement). Assume (c  c) x
v
 1. For all c; c; x; v; >
0 with c   and  2 (0; 1) ; we have that: (i)  is increasing in v; (ii)  is increasing
in x; (iii) 
 is decreasing in x; and (iv) if  < (c  c)x, then  is decreasing in ;
otherwise there exists a ^v satisfying 0  ^v  2(c c)x3+(c c)x such that 
 is decreasing in 
whenever v > ^v and increasing in  whenever v < ^v:
Proof of Proposition 3. To establish that  is increasing in v, note that at  = 0, the
gains from choosing integration (and hence becoming informed) instead of non-integration
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(and hence enjoying a cost reduction) are given by
 
TSE   TSM ( = 0) = 2v +2   2 (c  c)x
2 (c  c)
and at  = 1; the gains from choosing integration over non-integration are
 
TSE   TSM ( = 1) = 2v
2 (c  c)

1  1
2
v=x
c  c

  
2 + 2 (c  c)x
2 (c  c) :
Since we are at an interior solution,
 
TSE   TSM ( = 0) > 0 and  TSE   TSM ( = 1) <
0. Next, note that
 
TSE   TSM ( = 0) is increasing in v and  TSE   TSM ( = 1) is
increasing in v if (c  c) xv > 34 , which is true since (c  c) xv > 1. Since
 
TSE   TSM ()
is linear in , this then implies that  is increasing in v.
The comparative statics with respect to x and x are straightforward. Finally, note
that
@
@
= 2
  (c  c)x   2
v=x
c c
2v
2
+ 22
:
When  < (c  c)x, this is clearly negative. Otherwise, if , note that at v = 0,
2 =   2 (c  c)x, so this expression is positive. For v > 2(c c)x3+(c c)x , the expression
is negative. Since  is increasing in v, this implies that there is a cuto¤ value 0  ^v 
2(c c)x
3+(c c)x , a function of the other parameters of the model, for which v < ^v implies that
@
@
> 0 and v > ^v implies that @

@
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 4. Let b^ = (X 0X) 1X 0g be the OLS estimator of the "short"
regression where we regress the governance structure on only the rm-level characteristics
Xi (which for now we assume to be scalar). We can then show that
E
h
b^
Xi = Cov (Xi; gi)
V ar (Xi)
=  + 
1
n  1
1
V ar (Xi)
X
j 6=i
Cov (Xi; gj)
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Next, note that
gj = Xj + 
1
n  1
X
k 6=j
gk + "j;
so that for j 6= i, if we let Cov (Xi; Xj) = V ar (Xi),
Cov (Xi; gj) = V ar (Xi) + 
1
n  1
X
k 6=j
Cov (Xi; gk) ;
which can be rearranged to give

1 + 
1
n  1

Cov (Xi; gj) = V ar (Xi) + 
1
n  1
nX
k=1
Cov (Xi; gk) : (1)
For j = i,

1 + 
1
n  1

Cov (Xi; gi) = V ar (Xi) + 
1
n  1
nX
k=1
Cov (Xi; gk) ;
so that if we sum up over j, we get

1 + 
1
n  1
 nX
j=1
Cov (Xi; gj) = (1 + (n  1) ) V ar (Xi) +  n
n  1
nX
j=1
Cov (Xi; gj)
nX
j=1
Cov (Xi; gj) =
(1 + (n  1) )
1   V ar (Xi) :
Substituting this into (1), we get
Cov (Xi; gj) =
1
1  
+  1
n 1
1 +  1
n 1
V ar (Xi)
and thus
E
h
b^
Xi   = 
1  
+  1
n 1
1 +  1
n 1
;
which is the desired result.
Denition 4 The equilibrium informativeness of the price system is the expected reduction
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in variance that is obtained by conditioning on the price:
E

2v   2vjp

= 
2v
2
v=x
c  c :
Proposition 5 Assume (c  c) x
v
 1 and  2 (0; 1). Dene ! = 1
c c . If
1
2
2v
2
v
x
!
2v
2
v
x
! +2
2v +
2
2 (c  c) < x <
2v +
2
2 (c  c) ;
then
@Ex;v[2v 2vjp]
@!
> 0 and @

@!
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that
@
@!
=
2! 2x  
2
v
2
v
x

2v
2
v
x
! + 22
> 0
whenever
1
2
2v
2
v
x
!
2v
2
v
x
! +2
2v +
2
2! 1
< x <
2v +
2
2! 1
;
and
@Ex;v
h
2v   2vjp
i
@!
=
2v
2
v
x
 
22
2v
2
v
x
! + 22
 +
2! 1x
2v
2
v
x
! + 22
!
> 0;
so that equilibrium informativeness is increasing in !:
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